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CRIMINAL RICO AND DOUBLE JEOPARDY ANALYSIS
IN THE WAKE OF GRADY v. CORBIN: IS THIS
RICO'S ACHILLES' HEEL?
Congress enacted Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act
("RICO")' to curtail the extensive infiltration of organized crime
into legitimate business.2 RICO's broadly defined provisions en-
hance penalties3 and create new substantive offenses 4 which aug-
1 RICO is an acronym for "Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations" and
is Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act ("OCCA") of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452,
84 Stat. 941 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988)). OCCA contains twelve
substantive titles: Title 1, Special Grand Jury, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3331-3334 (1988); Title II,
General Immunity, id- 99 6001-6005; Title III, Recalcitrant Witnesses, 28 U.S.C. § 1826
(1988); Title IV, False Declarations, 18 U.S.C. § 1623; Title V, Protected Facilities for
Housing Government Witnesses, id § 3481; Title VI, Depositions, id. § 3503; Title VII,
Litigation Concerning Sources of Evidence, idL § 3504; Title VIII, Syndicated Gambling,
id. § 1511; Title X, Dangerous Special Offender Sentencing, id. §§ 3575-3578; Title XI,
Regulation of Explosives, id §§ 841-848; Title XII, National Commission of Individual
Rights, id § 3331.
2 Section 1 of the Organized Crime Control Act, Statement of Findings and Purposes,
provides:
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in
the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gather-
ing process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing en-
hanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of
those engaged in organized crime.
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Statement of Findings and Purposes, 84 Stat.
922, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1073. See infra notes 16-24 and accompanying text.
3 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988) describes the criminal penalties for violations of RICO
substantive offenses. These penalties include fines as high as $25,000, a prison term of
up to twenty years, and forfeiture of all property and interests in an enterprise, as de-
fined under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988). Section 1963 enhances the punishment which
may be imposed on an individual, because it permits higher fines and longer prison
terms for a RICO conviction than allowed for a single misdemeanor or felony offense.
For an in-depth treatment of the interplay between civil penalties, like forfeiture, and
criminal penalties, see generally Mary M. Chen, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies
to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Cyiminal-Civil Law Dis-
tinction, 42 HASINGS Lj. 1325 (1991).
4 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988) describes the substantive offenses for RICO, providing
in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income de-
rived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity.., to
use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the pro-
ceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establish-
ment or operation of, any enterprise which engages in, or the activities of
which affect, interstate or foreign commerce ....
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering
activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain,
directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce.
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ment a state's criminal prosecution resources. These substantive
offenses are a unique feature of the statute because they punish an
offender for engaging in a pattern of criminal activity, individual in-
stances of which are already proscribed by state and federal penal
laws. 5 Recent RICO prosecutions demonstrate a trend towards a
liberal construction of the Act's provisions. 6 This development
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with
any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the
conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity or collection of unlawful debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the
provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
5 See infra notes 20-37 and accompanying text.
6 RICO also contains a liberal construction clause, Title IX, § 904, 84 Stat. 947
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1988)), providing in pertinent part:
(a) The provisions of this title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its
remedial purposes.
(b) Nothing in this title shall supersede any provision of Federal, State,
or other law imposing criminal penalties or affording civil remedies in
addition to those provided for in this title.
Courts have consistently cited the Liberal Construction clause in support of expanding
the scope of RICO prosecutions. See, e.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479,
497-98 (1985) ("RICO is to be read broadly. This is the lesson not only of Congress'
self-consciously extensive language and overall approach ... but also of its express ad-
monition that RICO is to be 'liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.' ");
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 26-27 (1983) (legislative history reveals Congress
intended RICO provisions to be liberally construed); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S.
576, 587-593 (1980) (RICO's liberal construction clause and legislative history do not
prescribe a linfited reading of the word "enterprise"); United States v. Neapolitan, 791
F.2d 489, 495 (7th Cir.) ("Our analysis of section 1962(d) is guided by [the] rules of
RICO construction ... [T]he Supreme Court has consistently adhered to a broad, literal
reading of the statute."), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 939 (1986); United States v. Forsythe, 560
F.2d 1127, 1135-36 (3rd Cir. 1977) ("We note at the outset that Congress specifically
directed that the provisions of RICO 'shall be liberally construed to effectuate its reme-
dial purposes' [and] Courts have interpreted RICO in accordance with this Congres-
sional mandate"); United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083, 1090-91 (3rd Cir. 1977)
("Congress had no reason to adopt a constricted approach [towards RICO] .... We
refuse to believe that Congress had such 'tunnel-vision'. .. .), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072
(1978); United States v. Kaye, 556 F.2d 855, 859 (7th Cir.) ("It was the intent of Con-
gress that the provisions of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 be liberally con-
strued .. "), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 921 (1977).
See generally G. Robert Blakey & Brian Gettings, Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt Organi-
zations (RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1032-33
(1980) ("[T]he policy Congress properly mandated for the construction of RICO is one
of a generous, rather than a parsimonious reading of its promise of new criminal and
civil remedies."); William D. Fearnow, Note, RICO: Are the Courts Construing the Legislative
History Rather than the Statute Itself?, 55 NOTRE DAME LAw. 777, 783 (1980) ("If a court
can, in good faith, find no basis for a restrictive interpretation ... the wording of the
statute [sh]ould allow.., a broad interpretation."); Craig W. Palm, Note RICO and the
Liberal Constructzon Clause, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 167, 168 (1980) ("To strengthen RICO's
effectiveness, Congress included a unique liberal construction clause, mandating that
'the provisions of this title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial pur-
poses.' Most courts have followed the directive and interpreted RICO broadly"); Barry
Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling of The Prosecutor's Nursery, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 165, 169
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NOTE-RICO AND DOUBLE JEOPARDY
raises several important constitutional issues, particularly in the area
of double jeopardy analysis.
The Double Jeopardy Clause dictates that no person will "be
twice put in jeopardy of life-or limb" for the same offense.7 In Block-
burger v. United States,8 the Supreme Court abandoned the common-
law "same evidence" rule9 and established a constitutional standard
termed the "same offense" test. This test requires courts to com-
pare the statutory elements of each crime for which a defendant is
prosecuted; if the statutory elements are identical, the defendant is
being unconstitutionally prosecuted for the "same" offense. Re-
cently, in Grady v. Corbin,'0 the Supreme Court significantly modified
double jeopardy analysis by implementing a "conduct" test, which
focuses on the acts underlying the criminal charge rather than the
statutory elements of the offense. This conduct test gives defend-
ants strong protection under the Double Jeopardy Clause. How-
ever, a literal application of Grady in RICO cases creates potentially
anomalous results and is inconsistent with the goals of RICO.
Part I of this Note briefly summarizes the structure of RICO
and the history of doublejeopardy analysis, with particular focus on
Blockburger and its progeny." Part II discusses Grady and highlights
Justice Scalia's poignant dissent on the practical implications of the
majority's "conduct" test.12 Part III analyzes the potential effects of
the Grady conduct test when applied to RICO and argues that effec-
tive prosecution of RICO offenses necessarily infringes on individ-
ual constitutional rights.' 3 This Part also reviews recent decisions
construing Grady, which indicate that the Supreme Court will ulti-
mately have to reformulate the conduct test in order to provide a
consistent standard for lower courts to follow.1 4 In light of the
Tenth Circuit decision in United States v. Felix,15 presently pending
(1980) ("The government, encouraged by recent cases broadly construing Title IX, has
... urg[ed an] even broader construction[].").
7 The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution states:
"[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb;... nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law'..."
U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
The Double Jeopardy Clause applies to states through the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), overruling
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
8 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
9 See infra note 48.
10 110 S. Ct. 2084 (1990).
11 See infra notes 16-101 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 101-54 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 155-167 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 168-88 and accompanying text.
15 926 F.2d 1522 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 47 (1991).
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before the Supreme Court, and the tension between criminal RICO
and the Grady conduct test, the appropriate solution is to confine
Grady to its facts or construe the decision as inapplicable in a RICO
context.
I
BACKGROUND
A. RICO-The Statute
1. Purpose
When congressional leaders proposed the comprehensive Or-
ganized Crime Control Act of 1970 ("OCCA"), their intent was to
effectuate a single important goal: eradicate the effects of organized
crime on legitimate business. 16 Extensive legal research confirmed
that organized crime pervaded every facet of American life, includ-
ing the national-economy, interstate commerce, and government.' 7
16 Senator John L. McClellan, one of the driving forces behind the OCCA, stated
the OCCA's purpose:
Our society cannot... safely permit the operation within it of an under-
world organization as powerful and as immune from social accountability
as La Cosa Nostra. The success story of this group is symbolic of the
breakdown of law and order increasingly characteristic of our society. To
hold the allegiance of the now law abiding, society must show each man
that no man is above the law.... [I]t is to this end that [the OCCA] was
carefully drafted.
116 CONG. REC. 18,913 (1970) (statement of Sen. John L. McClellan).
17 Prior to the 1970 enactment of the OCCA, the nature of organized crime and its
effects on legitimate business had been extensively researched and reported by several
committees. For example, the Kefauver Committee investigated the effects of organized
crime on interstate commerce. See Hearings before a Special Comm. to Investigate Organized
Crime in Interstate Commerce, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1950-51); S. REP. No. 141, 82d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1951). See generally WILLIAM H. MOORE, THE KEFAUVER COMMITTEE AND THE
PoLrlcs OF CRIME, 1950-1952 (1974). The McClellan Committee studied the structure
of organized criminal networks, specifically La Cosa Nostra (the Mafia). See S. REP. No.
72, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). While the OCCA enjoyed wide support from a variety
of organizations, see, e.g., ABA REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME & LAW ENFORCEMENT 10
(1952-53), several representatives expressed dissenting views on the statute's enact-
ment. See Dissenting Views of Representative John Conyers, Jr., Representative Abner Mikva, &
Representative William Ryan, on the Organized Crime Control Act, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. (91 Stat.)
4076, 4081.
For a more extensive treatment of RICO's legislative history, see Organized Crime
Control: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on theJudiciary, on S.30 and Re-
lated Proposals, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) [hereinafter House Hearings on S.30]; MATERI-
ALS ON RICO: CRIMINAL OVERVIEW, CIVIL OVERVIEW, CORNELL INSTITUTE ON ORGANIZED
CRIME (Robert Blakey ed., 1980); Blakey & Gettings, supra note 6, at 1014-33; G. Robert
Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 249-83 (1982).
Approximately 27 states have adopted "Baby RICO" statutes that are substantively
similar to the OCCA. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-2301 to -2316 (1978 & Supp.
1988); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 27 186-186.6 (West 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-17-101
to -109 (1986 & Supp. 1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-393 to -403 (West 1985 &
Supp. 1989); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 §§ 1501-1511 (1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 895.01 to
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Organized crime was "big business" and existing criminal laws
proved inadequate to counter the resources of the well-endowed
"mafia" conglomerates.18 This research further disclosed that the
highly procedural nature of criminal law and the minimal penalties
assessed for individual felonies made deterrence of larger organiza-
tional activity virtually impossible. 19 OCCA drafters specifically
designed RICO to alleviate these problems.
RICO is an innovative statute which removes many of the obsta-
cles to effective organized crime control.20 It gives prosecutors
greater freedom in utilizing various law enforcement measures, and
allows them to target organized criminal networks. Substantively,
RICO does not proscribe any new criminal activity.2 1 Its penalties
are only triggered when the prosecution proves that a group of indi-
.09 (West Supp. 1989); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-3401 to -3414 (Harrison 1988 & Supp.
1988); HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 842-1 to -12 (1985 & Supp. 1988); ID. CODE § 1651-1660
(Smith-Hurd 1985); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:1351 to :1356 (West Supp. 1989)(limited
to narcotics); MINN. STAT. §§ 609.901 to .912 (Supp. 1989); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 97-43-
1 to -11 (Supp. 1988); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 207.350 to .520 (Michie 1986); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:41-1 to -46.2 (West 1982 & Supp. 1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-42-1
to -6 (1978 & Supp. 1988); N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 460.00 to .80 (McKinney Supp. 1988);
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75D-I to -14 (1987 & Supp. 1988); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-06 to
.1-08 (1985 & Supp. 1989); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2923.31 to .36 (Anderson 1987 &
Supp. 1988); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1401-1419 (West Supp. 1989); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 166-715 to -735 (1985 & Supp. 1988); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 911 (1983 & Supp.
1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 7-15-1 to -11 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-12-201 to -210
(Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-10-1601 to -1609 (Supp. 1989); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 9A.82.001 to .904 (1988 & Supp. 1989); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 946-80 to -87
(West Supp. 1987).
18 See House Hearings on S.30, supra note 17, at 78, where Senator McCullogh states:
Organized crime is big government. It is a system unto itself. It lives by
its own laws, maintains its own means of law enforcement, demands and
gets unsurpassing loyalty. ... Organized crime is big business .... It
diminishes the quality of American life. Its corrupting influence perme-
ates small businesses as well as big businesses. It undermines local,
State, and Federal Government.
19 Id at 106 (statement of Sen. John L. McClellan):
This is so because the criminal process has suffered from two major limi-
tations as a means of protecting our economic institutions from this kind
of infiltration. The first disability is procedural. Since a criminal convic-
tion subjects a defendant to penalties involving loss of life, liberty, or
property, our law quite properly has burdened the government in a crimi-
nal case with strict procedural handicaps, placing the government proce-
durally at a relative disadvantage. This one-sided character of the
criminal process has been a handicap in the use of the criminal law as a
means of avoiding infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime,
just as it has hindered the use of the criminal law to curb other aspects of
organized crime.
20 See Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts I & II, 87 COLUM.
L. RE V. 661 (1987) (RICO was designed to eliminate "all the factors inhibiting [effective]
law enforcement response to organized crime, the single most important [being] the
procedural and evidentiary difficulty of making cases.").
21 See Jeff Atkinson, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-
68: Broadest of the Federal Criminal Statutes, 69J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1978).
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viduals have engaged in a series of illegal activities already punish-
able under existing state and federal laws. 22 Procedurally, RICO
focuses on group activity. 23 It allows law enforcement officials to act
against multiple defendants, usually the principals of the criminal
network, rather than only one or two individuals. These features,
combined with its broad statutory language, make RICO an attrac-
tive alternative to existing prosecutorial tools. In addition, RICO's
structure allows for a flexible application in a variety of settings.24
2. Structure
Internally, RICO's tripartite structure defines substantive of-
fenses 25, criminal penalties26 and civil remedies. 27 RICO substan-
tive offenses prohibit the acquisition, operation, or control of an
"enterprise" or business through a "pattern of racketeering. ' 28
These two elermients-the pattern of racketeering and the enter-
prise-are hallmarks of a RICO violation. Specifically, the enter-
prise element focuses on the organized nature of the criminal activity.
The pattern element incorporates various substantive federal and
state criminal violations as "predicates" to establishing a RICO
offense.29
22 See infra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
23 See infra note 32.
24 RICO's statutory provisions permit a flexible application because they are prem-
ised on the concept of "enterprise criminality." Enterprise criminality focuses on crimi-
nal activity within a business context. It targets a group of people engaged in various
illegal activities for the purpose of furthering a legitimate or illicit business. See Michael
Goldsmith & Vicki Rinne, Civil RICO, Foreign Defendants, and "ET," 73 MINN. L. REv.
1023, 1034-35 (1989) ("RICO provides both civil and criminal sanctions against persons
engaged in 'enterprise criminality.' Because RICO focuses on enterprises, it strikes at
the organizational foundation of systemic crime."); Michael Goldsmith, RICO and Enter-
prise Criminality: A Response to Gerard E. Lynch, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 774, 775 (1988):
Concern with enterprise criminality provided the impetus for RICO.
Congress recognized that previous efforts against organized crime had
failed because the focus had been on individual prosecutions rather than
on organizational foundations. Since the structure and strength of or-
ganized crime transcend its membership, criminal enterprises could
thrive despite successful individual prosecutions;
Thomas S. O'Neill, Note, Functions of the RICO Enterprise Concept, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
646, 649 n.12 (1989) ("Enterprise criminality.. .speaks of the commission of crime in
the context of an organization, which is as easily a corporation as a Mafia family .... ").
See also United States v. Gonzalez, 921 F.2d 1530 (11 th Cir. 1991); Busby v. Crown Sup-
ply, Inc., 896 F.2d 833 (4th Cir. 1990).
25 See supra note 4.
26 See supra note 3.
27 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1988).
28 See infra notes 30-39 and accompanying text for discussion of the enterprise and
pattern elements as well as a definition of "racketeering."
29 See infra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
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a. Enterprise Element
Section 1961(4) defines an enterprise as "any individual, part-
nership, corporation, association or other legal entity, and any
union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal
entity."30 Courts have broadly construed the enterprise element to
bring a wide array of organizations within the scope of the Act.31
Recently, prosecutors have attempted to stretch the enterprise
element of RICO to include a "single person concept."3 2 The sin-
gle person concept stems from a literal interpretation of the defini-
tion of an enterprise. It equates the "enterprise" with an individual
rather than a group of people working within an organization. This
concept is problematic, however, because it allows prosecutors to
circumvent the enterprise element and focus solely on an individ-
ual's pattern of illicit conduct to prove the RICO violation. By sub-
jecting individual criminals to RICO's enhanced penalty structure,
courts reach a result contrary to that envisioned by the Act.
b. Pattern of Racketeering
The second requirement for a RICO substantive violation is a
"pattern of racketeering activity."' 33 This racketeering activity in-
30 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988).
31 See Tarlow, supra note 6, at 169-70:
RICO violations have been alleged against an astonishing variety of de-
fendants, including members of the Hell's Angels motorcycle dub, a fac-
tory worker at General Motors, a large Japanese corporation
manufacturing electrical cable, magistrates, constables, and employees of
the Allegheny County court system, and union leaders accused of
junketeering. Most defendants charged with violating RICO could not
conceivably be included within the traditional or newly expanded defini-
tions of organized crime. (footnotes omitted).
32 See Atkinson, supra note 21, at 12-13; Tarlow, supra note 6, at 14-15. The "single
person" concept of the enterprise element is not widely adopted by the courts. How-
ever, there are a few reported opinions accepting the theory. See, e.g., United States v.
Marrone, 746 F.2d 957, 958 (3d Cir. 1984) ("An enterprise offense under § 1962(c) may
be committed by an individual acting alone ...."); United States v. Elliot, 571 F.2d 880,
898 n.18 (5th Cir.) ("The number of persons making up an enterpise is irrelevant, how-
ever, in that even a single individual may be considered an 'enterprise' under the statu-
tory definition."), reh'g denied, 575 F.2d 300, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978). But see
Cullen v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698, 729 (2d Cir. 1987) (court stated that a solitary entity
cannot simultaneously be RICO "person" and "enterprise"), cert. denied, Nassau County
Republican Comm., 483 U.S. 1021 (1987); United States v. Feldman, 853 F.2d 648, 656
(9th Cir.) ("To be convicted of a RICO violation, the defendant '"person" must be
separate and distinct entity from the "enterprise"' (quoting Schreiber Dist. Corp. v.
Servwell Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1396 (9th Cir. 1986))), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1030
(1989).
For a general discussion of the enterprise element, see David Vitter, The RICO Enter-
prise as Distinct from the Pattern of Racketeering Activity: Clarifying the Minority View, 62 TUL. L.
Rav. 1419 (1988); O'Neill, supra note 24, at 656.
33 Racketeering activity is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(1988) to incorporate
eight state offenses: murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion,
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cludes both state and federal offenses, which are referred to as
"predicates" because the prosecutor must first establish a violation
of at least two of the enumerated offenses in order to meet the pat-
tern requirement of the substantive RICO offense.
The pattern requirement is the more controversial aspect of a
RICO substantive violation because the language of the Act does
not specify what constitutes a "pattern." 3 4 Section 1961(5) defines
pattern of racketeering activity as "at least two acts of racketeering
activity, one of which occurred ... within ten years . . .after the
commission of a prior act of racketeering activity."35 This defini-
tion, however, has yielded a variety of interpretations and spawned
several legislative attempts to clarify its meaning.3 6
and dealing in narcotics; and 22 separate federal offenses: bribery, counterfeiting, theft
from interstate shipments, embezzlement of pension and welfare funds, extortionate
credit transactions, transmission of gambling information, mail fraud, wire fraud, ob-
struction ofjustice, obstruction of criminal investigations, interference with commerce,
racketeering, unlawful welfare payments, white slave traffic, embezzlement of union
funds, bankruptcy fraud, fraud in securities, transporting contraband, illegal gambling
businesses, dealing in narcotics and dangerous drugs, and interstate transportation of
wagering paraphernalia.
34 See Edward S.G. Dennis, Jr., Current RICO Policies and the Department ofJustice, 43
VAND. L. REv. 651, 651-72 (1990) (arguing that, in light of recent Supreme Court deci-
sion in HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989), the interpretation of
the pattern element still contains ambiguities: "[A]fter H.J. Inc., all we know for certain
is that a pattern of racketeering activity need not involve separate schemes ... [t]he task
will be to improve RICO by supplying some clarity to the pattern element." Dennis,
supra at 667); Michael Goldsmith, RICO and "Pattern:'" The Search for "Continuity Plus Rela-
tionship," 73 CORNELL L. REv. 971, 989-1003 (1988)("[T]he meaning of pattern is cur-
rently the most controversial interpretative issue arising under . . . 'RICO'. . . . The
controversy surrounding this element stems from two factors. First, RICO does not
define 'pattern of racketeering activity' . . . Second .... the judiciary [has] fail[ed] to
interpret the pattern element meaningfully."); see also supra note 33.
35 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988).
36 The expansive interpretation of the RICO pattern element has led to several
attempts to clarify the provision's language. See RICO Reform Act of 1989: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Crime, of Comm. on the Judiciay, House of Representatives, on H.R. 1046, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 939 (1989) (H.R. 1046 was designed to amend the statutory language of
RICO. In particular, § 102 of H.R. 1046, entitled "Pattern," expands the current defini-
tion and requirements for pattern of racketeering as follows:
"pattern of racketeering activity" means
(A) three or more acts of racketeering activity ....
(B) the last act of racketeering activity occurred within five years of a
prior act of racketeering activity,
(C) the acts of racketeering activity were related to each other or to the
affairs of an enterprise,
(D) the acts of racketeering activity were part of a continuing series of
acts of racketeering.
Id. See also Proposed RICO Reform Legislation: Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary,
U.S. Senate, on S. 1523, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 401 (1987)(S. 1523 proposes renaming the
18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) definition, "pattern of racketeering activity," to "pattern of unlaw-
ful activity"); RICO Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, the Comm. on the
Judiciary, House of Representatives, on H.R. 2517, H.R. 4892, H.R. 5290, H.R. 5391, and
H.R. 5445, 99th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 261 (1986) (statement of John C. Keeney, U.S.
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One approach which gained considerable acceptance by the
courts focused on the "continuity and interrelatedness" of the rack-
eteering acts to establish the pattern element.3 7 This narrowed the
application of RICO's pattern element by requiring the court to de-
termine the relationship between the individual acts, as well as their
continuity. Thus, a pattern of racketeering activity was established
only when the racketeering acts were connected and not simply a
series of disconnected acts.38 The pattern element also raises the
unresolved issue of whether separate prosecutions for a RICO sub-
stantive offense and for a specific predicate offense are permissible
in light of double jeopardy prohibitions.39
B. Double Jeopardy
The concept of double jeopardy is rooted in the common-law
maxim that "no man shall be twice put in jeopardy of life and
limb." 40 Historically, this phrase bore particular significance in
criminal proceedings where offenses were punishable by death or
mutilation.4 ' Doublejeopardy later came to stand for a defendant's
constitutional right to be free from excessive punishment and the
burden of multiple criminal proceedings. 42 The United States Con-
stitution incorporates these principles under the Fifth Amendment's
Dep't ofJustice) (H.R. 2517 amends RICO's criminal provisions by redefining key terms
such as "enterprise" and "racketeer." Also, H.R. 2517 "substantially change[s] the defi-
nition of RICO's central element of 'pattern of racketeering activity.' ").
Commentators have also proposed legislative revision of RICO. See, e.g., G. Robert
Blakey & Thomas A. Perry, An Analysis of the Myths that Bolster Efforts to Rewrite RICO and
Various Proposals for Reform: "Mother of God-Is This the End of RICO, " 43 VAND. L. REv.
851, 964 (1990):
[TI]o draft a more concrete definition of "pattern," it is necessary to de-
termine how the word is used in the statute. Any definition of "pattern"
must also meet two tests. First, the definition must work in both criminal
and civil litigation. Second, it must work in all sections of the statute.
Finally, careful attention must be given to the setting in which the word
appears in the statute.
37 See United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370, 1381 (2d Cir.) ("[W]e conclude
today that ... a RICO pattern may not be established without some showing that the
racketeering acts are interrelated and that there is continuity or a threat of con-
tinuity .. "), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811 (1989); United States v. Kaye, 556 F.2d 855, 860-
61 (7th Cir.) (defendant engaging in continuous and related activity over four and one-
half years established pattern requirement for RICO violation), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 921
(1977); United States v. White, 386 F. Supp. 882, 883-84 (E.D. Wis. 1974) ("[T]here is
implicit in the statutory definition of 'pattern of racketeering activity' a requirement that
the government must prove such an interrelatedness beyond a reasonable doubt in or-
der to obtain a conviction under [RICO].").
38 See Tarlow, supra note 6, at 214.
39 See infra notes 42-86 and accompanying text.
40 See, e.g., Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 69 (1866).
41 See JAY A. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 1-37 (1969).
42 Id.
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Double Jeopardy Clause. In Green v. United States,43 the Supreme
Court reiterated the purpose of this Clause:
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the
Anglo-American system ofjurisprudence, is that the State with all
its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated
attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and com-
pelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity,
as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he
may be found guilty. 4 4
Thus, the Double Jeopardy" Clause protects against multiple
prosecutions after an acquittal or conviction, and against multiple
punishments for the same offense. 45 The language of the Clause,
however, provided little guidance for double jeopardy analysis and,
as a result, early analysis borrowed heavily from historical precepts
found in English common law.4 6
43 355 U.S. 184 (1957). See Donald E. Burton, Note, A Closer Look at the Supreme
Court and Double Jeopardy Clause, 49 OHIO ST. LJ. 799, 803 (1988).
44 355 U.S. at 187-88.
45 The Supreme Court recognized that the Double Jeopardy Clause has incorpo-
rated these protections in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717-19 (1969).
46 See SIGLER, supra note 41, at 21-27. For a comprehensive discussion of the devel-
opment and history of English jurisprudence, see generally HERMAN COHEN, THE SPIRIT
OF OUR LAWS (1967); FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENG-
LAND (1908); EDWARD JENKS, A SHORT HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1912).
Double jeopardy analysis originated in the English common-law system of pleas.
Under this highly structured practice, courts decided jeopardy claims based on the pleas
a defendant entered at trial. Three pleas, autrefoits acquit, autrefoits convict, and autrefoits
attaint, were available to the defendant in an action against a second trial. The most
common plea used was the autrefoits acquit, which barred a second criminal action after
acquittal in the first proceeding. Courts only recognized these defenses, however, when
the second prosecution was for the identical act and crime. For example, ifA broke into
B's home and stole B's possessions, A could be charged with larceny and trespass. Based
on the written pleas, these two offenses were distinct at law, even though they arose out
of a single act. Therefore, if the jury acquitted A for larceny in the first trial, this did not
preclude a second prosecution for trespass. Since an individual's unlawful conduct
could violate several criminal laws, this rigid plea system only afforded defendant's mini-
mal protection against severe penalties for offenses. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMEN-
TARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 396-99 (Robert M. Kerr ed., 1962):
The plea of auterfois acquit, or a former acquittal, is grounded on this
universal maxim of the common law of England, that no man is to be
brought into jeopardy more than once for the same offence. And hence it
is allowed as a consequence, that when a man once fairly found not guilty
upon any indictment, or other jurisdiction of the offence, he may plead
such acquittal in bar of any subsequent accusation for the same crime.
Secondly, the plea of auterfois convict, or a former conviction for the
same identical crime, though nojudgement was ever given, is a good plea
in bar to an indictment.
See also HERBERT BLOOM & EDWARD A. HADLEY, 4 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENG-
LAND 428-439 (1869); SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN
240-254 (1778); and F.W. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW (A.H.
Clayton & WJ. Whittaker eds., 1962).
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1. The Traditional Blockburger "Same Offense" Test
In Blockburger v. United States,47 the Supreme Court enunciated
the "same offense" test as the federal constitutional standard for
double jeopardy analysis.48 In Blockburger, the defendant was con-
victed for a drug sale that violated two separate substantive provi-
sions of the Harrison Narcotics Act.49 After construing the
legislative history of the Harrison Act, the trial court ruled that each
provision required imposition of a separate penalty and sentenced
Blockburger to five years imprisonment and a $2000 fine for each
offense.50 On appeal, Blockburger argued that the trial court erred
when it imposed a cumulative sentence because he was being pun-
ished twice for the same conduct.51
The Blockburger Court rejected this contention and stated that
the proper test for double jeopardy analysis required a court to
compare the statutory elements of each offense and determine if
one required proof of a fact which the other did not. If the neces-
sary facts were identical, then the offenses were actually one and the
47 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
48 This test replaced its common-law predecessor, the "same evidence" test.
Under the same evidence test, the Government is prevented from introducing evidence
used in the first trial against a defendant in a subsequent proceeding. For example,
suppose a defendant robbed two individuals, A and B. If the Government prosecuted
the defendant in one trial for theft from A, this did not preclude a subsequent trial for
theft from B because the evidence with respect to the things stolen from A would not be
the same as that for B. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 452-53, 452 nA (1970)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
The Supreme Court, in Grady v. Corbin, 110 S. Ct. 2084, 2084 n.12 (1990), noted
that several commentators have erroneously equated the Blockburger same offense test
with the same evidence test. See, e.g., Marcy D. Hirschfeld et al., Eighteenth Annual Review
of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Court of Appeals 1987-88; Preliminary
Proceedings: Double Jeopardy, 77 GEo. LJ. 695, 878 n.1834 (1989); Kenneth M. Murchison,
The Dual Sovereignty Exception to Double Jeopardy, 14 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 435
(1986); KarenJ. Ciupak, Note, RICO and the Predicate Offenses: An Analysis of DoubleJeopardy
and Verdict Consistency Problems, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 390 (1982).
49 Harrison Narcotics Act, ch. 18, § 1006, 40 Stat. 1057, 1131 (1919). As quoted
by the Court, 284 U.S. at 300 n.1, § 1 of the Act stated:
It is unlawful for any person to purchase, sell, dispense, or distribute any
of the aforesaid drugs [opium and other narcotics] except in the original
stamped package or from the original stamped package ... and the ab-
sence of appropriate tax-paid stamps ... shall be prima fade evidence of
a violation of this section ....
Section 2 of the Act stated:
It is unlawful for any person to sell, barter, exchange, or give away any of
the drugs... in pursuance of a written order of the person to whom such
article is sold .... on a form to be issued in blank for that purpose by the
Commissioner of the Internal Revenue.
284 U.S. at 300 n.2.
50 284 U.S. at 301.
51 Id.
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same.52 For example, suppose the defendant committed an unlaw-
ful act that violated two statutes, X and Y. If crime X consists of
elements A and B but crime Y consists of elements C and D, under
Blockburger the two offenses would be distinct because Y requires dif-
ferent elements of proof from X. Conversely, if both statutes con-
tained elements A, B, C, and D, then the Blockburger test prohibits
prosecution because the statutes were technically the same offense.
In essence, the inquiry focused on a comparison of statutory ele-
ments, rather than the defendant's conduct, to determine whether
separate prosecutions were constitutionally permissible.53
In Blockburger, after analyzing the Harrison Narcotics Act, the
Supreme Court concluded that the two provisions were distinct be-
cause one required proof of a valid, tax-stamped package, while the
other required a written order from the Commissioner of the Inter-
nal Revenue.54 Affirming Blockburger's conviction, the Court
stated that "[t]he plain meaning of the provision[s] is that each of-
fense is subject to the penalty prescribed; and if that be too harsh,
the remedy must be afforded by act of Congress, not by judicial leg-
islation under the guise of construction."55
Blockburger provided the applicable standard for double jeop-
ardy analysis in the context of cumulative punishment.5 6 Courts
were permitted to impose additional penalties only if the offenses
first satisfied the Blockburger test of distinct statutory elements, and
only if the legislature clearly mandated separate penalties for each
offense. However, the Blockburger test afforded little protection
against successive prosecutions. An innovative prosecutor could
easily meet the Blockburger standard by separating the charges aris-
ing out of the defendant's conduct into separate proceedings,
thereby securing a more stringent sentence. 57 Even if the defendant
52 Id at 304.
53 Cf Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785 (1975).
54 284 U.S. at 302-04.
55 Id. at 305.
56 Cumulative punishment occurs when the court imposes separate penalties for
separate offenses even though they arise out of the same criminal transaction. For cases
analyzing double jeopardy, see Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, reh'g denied, 492 U.S. 932
(1989); Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856 (1985); United States v. Woodward, 469 U.S.
105 (1985); United States v. Fontanez, 869 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v.
Anderson, 851 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1012 (1989); United
States v. Rodriguez, 858 F.2d 809 (1st Cir. 1988).
57 Issues concerning multiplicity and duplicity, however, could possibly bar this
choice of action. Duplicity is when two of more distinct and separate offenses are joined
in a single count. Multiplicity occurs when the State charges a single offense in several
counts. CHARLES A. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL 2d § 142
(1982).
For cases defining duplicity, see United States v. Duncan, 850 F.2d 1104 (6th Cir.
1988): United States v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 54, 56 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 817
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secured an acquittal on one charge in an initial trial, Blockburger al-
lowed the prosecution to "refine its presentation" on alternative
charges and improve the probability of conviction in a second
proceeding. 58
To remedy this problem, the Supreme Court made two signifi-
cant modifications to double jeopardy analysis. First, it extended
the scope of the Double Jeopardy Clause by incorporating the doc-
trine of collateral estoppel. Second, the Court narrowed the scope
of Blockburger's precedent by creating exceptions to the same of-
fense test.
2. The Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel (Blockburger-Ashe)
The Supreme Court first modified Blockburger in Ashe v. Swen-
son,59 holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause embodied the doc-
trine of collateral estoppel. 60 Collateral estoppel prohibits
relitigation of any and all factual issues fully adjudicated in a prior
proceeding. This new Blockburger-Ashe standard is significant be-
cause it not only pushes double jeopardy analysis beyond the
threshold of the same offense test, but also provides defendants
with additional protection against multiple prosecutions.
(1987); United States v. Aguilar, 756 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Hawkes,
753 F.2d 355 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Lyons, 703 F.2d 815, 821 (5th Cir. 1983).
For cases defining multiplicity, see United States v. Kazenbach, 824 F.2d 649 (8th
Cir. 1987); United States v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp., 659 F.Supp 1487 (E.D.N.Y.
1987), aft'd, 871 F.2d 1181, cert. denied, Lavery v. United States, 493 U.S. 933 (1989);
United States v. Sadlier, 649 F. Supp. 1560 (D. Mass. 1986).
58 See 397 U.S. at 447, in which the State conceded that after the defendant was
acquitted in one trial, the prosecutor did, at a subsequent trial, "what every good attor-
ney would do-he refined his presentation in light of the turn of events at the first trial."
59 Id. at 436.
60 The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 states that under collateral es-
toppel (issue preclusion), "when an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and deter-
mined by a valid and final judgement, and the determination is essential to the
judgement, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties,
whether on the same or a different claim." But see Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 456
(1982) (substantial overlap of proof no bar to second prosecution) and Diaz v. United
States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912) (exception exists when the State is unable to proceed be-
cause additional facts necessary to sustain the charge have not occurred or have not
been discovered). See also Anne B. Poulin, Collateral Estoppel in Criminal Cases: Reuse of
Evidence After Acquittal, 58 U. CINN. L. REv. 1 (1989); Burton, supra note 43, at 813:
[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause is an absolute bar to retrial after acquittal
(an acquittal is "a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual
elements of the offense charged"). "[A] verdict of acquittal is final, end-
ing a defendant's jeopardy." The clause is also an absolute bar to further
proceedings even if an acquittal is based on an erroneous interpretation
of law; an appellate court cannot reverse a judge's acquittal even if the
judge based the acquittal "upon an egregiously erroneous foundation."
(footnotes omitted).
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In Ashe, the defendant was charged with participating in a gang
robbery of a six-man poker game.61 The central issue at trial was
the identity of the robbers. The jury acquitted the defendant of all
charges due to insufficient evidence. The State then prosecuted
Ashe a second time, charging him with theft from a different player
involved in the same poker game. 62 The Court held that the appli-
cation of collateral estoppel barred the subsequent prosecution be-
cause the first trial had already adjudicated the "essential element"
of the second proceeding, the identity of Ashe as one of the
robbers.6 3
The Blockburger-Ashe standard modified double jeopardy analysis
by requiring courts to perform a two-step process when deciding
double jeopardy claims. A court first must apply the traditional
Blockburger test, comparing statutory elements of the offenses
charged in both proceedings. If the elements are not identical, then
the court must review the substantive and procedural issues adjudi-
cated in the first trial.64 If the "essential elements" of the second
61 397 U.S. at 437-38.
62 Id at 446.
63 Id at 439-42. The Supreme Court also reversed the conviction, because thejury
in the first trial, by its verdict that petitioner was not one of the robbers, constitutionally
foreclosed the State from relitigating that issue in another trial. Id. at 446.
Justice Brennan, writing a concurring opinion, agreed with the majority's position
but stated that the constitutional guarantee under the Double Jeopardy Clause extends
beyond the mere prohibitions of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Citing the inade-
quacies of early double jeopardy analysis and changes in modern criminal procedure, Id.
at 451-54, Brennan argued that the judicial standard should be a "same transaction"
test, which requires prosecutors to join all charges arising out of a single act in one
proceeding. In his view, this test was ideal because it
not only enforces the ancient prohibition against vexatious multiple pros-
ecutions embodied in the Double Jeopardy Clause, but responds as well
to the increasingly widespread recognition that the consolidation in one
lawsuit of all issues arising out of a single transaction or occurrence best
promotes justice, economy, and convenience.
Id at 454. See also infra note 151.
Brennan also referred to the origins of double jeopardy in English common law.
He referred to the "same evidence" test which "prevents the government from intro-
ducing in a subsequent prosecution any evidence that was introduced in a preceding
prosecution." Grady v. Corbin, 110 S. Ct. 2084, 2093 (1990). This standard has been
rejected by the Court because it created anomalous results, especially in multiple
prosecutions.
The 'same evidence' [test] deficiencies are obvious. It does not enforce
but virtually annuls the constitutional guarantee .... Given the tendency
of modem criminal legislation to divide the phases of a criminal transac-
tion into numerous separate crimes, the opportunities for multiple prose-
cutions for an essentially unitary criminal episode are frightening... the
potentialities for abuse inherent in the 'same evidence' test are simply
intolerable.
Id. at 451-52.
64 Specifically, the court must review the "prior proceedings taking into account the
pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, [to] conclude whether a rational
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offense were adjudicated in the first trial, the prosecution is barred.
For example, Ashe, in the first trial, was charged and acquitted of
robbing poker player Knight.65 In the second proceeding, the State
charged Ashe with theft from poker player Roberts. 66 The offenses
were distinct under Blockburger analysis because the victims were dif-
ferent. However, after assessing the facts and evidence in the first
trial, the Court determined that the substantive issue of the second
prosecution, the identity of Ashe as one of the robbers, had already
been adjudicated.67 The Blockburger-Ashe standard, therefore, pro-
vided defendants with additional double jeopardy protection, espe-
cially in the context of multiple proceedings.
3. Greater and Lesser-Included Offenses (Blockburger-Brown)
The Supreme Court modified double jeopardy analysis again in
Brown v. Ohio68 by extending Blockburger to incorporate the standard
of greater and lesser-included offenses. In Brown, the defendant
stole a car and drove it for nine days, violating two Ohio statutory
provisions-joyriding and auto theft.69 The Ohio statute defined
joyriding as "[unlawfully] taking or operating a car without the
owner's consent. ' 70 Auto theft, however, required only an addi-
tional element of intent to deprive the owner of permanent posses-
sion.71 The Court concluded that 'joyriding" constituted a lesser-
included offense because it "require[d] no proof beyond that which
[was] required for conviction of the greater [offense]-auto theft." 72
A lesser-included offense exists when all of the elements neces-
sary.for its proof also constitute the elements necessary to establish
another, greater offense. In essence, conduct that violates the
jury could have founded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant
seeks to foreclose from consideration." Id. at 444 (quoting Sealfon v. United States, 332
U.S. 575, 579 (1948).
65 Id- at 438.
66 Id. at 439.
67 Id at 446.
68 432 U.S. 161 (1977). The Supreme Court reaffirmed the Brown holding in Harris
v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977) (per curiam), which presented the converse situation
of a prosecution for the lesser-included offense after a prior conviction on the greater
offense. "When, as here, conviction of a greater crime, murder, cannot be had without
conviction of the lesser crime, robbery with firearms, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars
prosecution for the lesser crime after conviction of the greater one." Id at 682. See
also infra notes 125-26 and accompanying text for a discussion ofJustice Scalia's view on
Harris and its effect on double jeopardy analysis. Justice Brennan also concurred in Har-
ris, reiterating his position that the Court should adopt a "same transaction" approach
for double jeopardy analysis. 433 U.S. at 683.
69 432 U.S. at 162-63.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 163.
72 Id. at 168.
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greater offense automatically establishes proof of the lesser. For ex-
ample, suppose crime X requires proof of elements A, B, C, and
crime Y requires proof of A, B, C, D, and E. A comparison of the
statutes reveals that the elements of Y necessarily include all of the
elements of X and proof of a Y violation automatically establishes
proof of X. Under the new Blockburger-Brown standard, X becomes a
lesser-included offense. Thus, failure to prove X (the lesser-
included offense) in the first trial bars a later prosecution for Y (the
greater offense) because the statutes are treated as creating the
same offense. 73
This revised double jeopardy standard, therefore, increases the
protection available to defendants by requiring a more thorough
analysis of the statutory elements of offenses charged in both pro-
ceedings. In addition, this modification adds a third tier to double
jeopardy analysis. First, the court compares the statutory elements
of the relevant offenses (Blockburger); second, the court determines if
the elements of one offense entirely incorporate those of the other
(Blockburger-Brown); and third, the court performs a retrospective re-
view of the prior proceedings (Blockburger-Ashe).
4. Blockburger Converted from a Constitutional Standard to a
Statutory Rule of Construction-Whalen v. United
States 74
The decisions in Brown and Ashe increased the protection from
multiple prosecutions provided by the Blockburger same offense test.
By applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel and prohibiting mul-
tiple prosecution for both greater and lesser-included offenses,
these decisions increased the double jeopardy protection available
to defendants. In Whalen v. United States,75 however, the Supreme
Court significantly altered double jeopardy analysis by converting
Blockburger from a constitutional standard to a statutory rule of con-
struction-a change which raises new issues regarding the protec-
tion available under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
In Blockburger, the Court held that the two provisions of the
Harrison Narcotics Act were distinct under its newly enunciated
same offense test, because one required proof of an additional fact
which the other did not.76 After the Blockburger test was satisfied, the
73 Even if crime X had additional elements, such as F and G, that made it distinct
from crime Y for purposes of the Blockburger and Blockburger-Brown standards, the court
must still review the prior proceedings under the Blockburger-Ashe standard to determine
if collateral estoppel bars the second prosecution.
74 445 U.S. 684 (1980).
75 Id.
76 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). See also supra notes 47-58 and
accompanying text.
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Court imposed an additional sentence against the defendant, find-
ing that Congress had specifically provided separate penalties for
each provision.77 The difficulty, however, with the Court's decision
in Blockburger is that it fails to determine whether a similar result
would be reached if the converse situation occurred. 78 For example,
if a defendant violated crimes X and Y, both of which required proof
of elements A, B, and C, would the Double Jeopardy Clause still bar
the imposition of cumulative punishment despite clear legislative in-
tent to the contrary? The Court did not resolve the question of
whether Blockburger mandated this result until Whalen v. United
States. 79
In Whalen, the defendant was convicted on two charges-rape
and felony murder.8 0 Under District of Columbia law, to establish
felony murder the State had to prove that the defendant violated
one of six enumerated felonies, which included rape.81 The trial
court sentenced Whalen to two consecutive terms of imprisonment,
twenty years to life for first degree murder and fifteen years to life
for rape.82 On appeal, Whalen argued that the trial court erred in
imposing consecutive sentences because felony murder included
rape as a lesser-included offense and current Blockburger analysis
compelled a finding that this inclusion resulted in the same of-
fense.83 The court of appeals, however, rejected this assertion, and
the issue raised before the Supreme Court was whether the constitu-
tional prohibition against double jeopardy permitted separate pun-
ishment for two offenses considered the same under Blockburger.84
The Court stated that the proper disposition of this issue de-
pended on congressional intent and referred to Blockburger as the
appropriate "rule for statutory construction." 85
77 Id.
78 But cf Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 779 (1985) (finding in a RICO
decision that the "[B]lockburger rule is not controlling when the legislative intent is
clear from the face of the statute or the legislative history.") See also infra notes 155-88
and accompanying text for discussion of double jeopardy analysis in the RICO context.
79 445 U.S. 684 (1980).
80 Id at 685.
81 Id. at 686. The District of Columbia had a special statutory offense under the
first degree murder rule. The felony murder offense in this case was incorporated under
this law. D.C. CODE § 22-2401 (1973).
82 445 U.S. at 685.
83 Id. at 684.
84 Id.
85 For decisions accepting the Whalen position on Blockburger, see Garrett v. United
States, 471 U.S. 773 (1985); Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (1983); Albernaz v.
United States, 450 U.S. 333 (1981). See also Jennifer Hoagland, Double Jeopardy and Penn-
sylvania's Merger Doctrine, 62 TEMP. L. REv. 663 (1989)(discusses double jeopardy and
legislative history); George C. Thomas III, RICO Prosecutions and the Double Jeop-
ardy/Multiple Punishment Problem, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 1368-86 (1984) (discusses the limita-
tions of Blockburger as a constitutional test and proposes a conduct-based test).
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[T]his Court [has] consistently relied on [Blockburger] to deter-
mine whether Congress has in a given situation provided that two
statutory offenses may be punished cumulatively. . . Accord-
ingly, where two statutory provisions proscribe the "same
offense," they are construed not to authorize cumulative punish-
ments in the absence of a clear indication of contrary legislative
intent."8 6
Applying the Blockburger rule in Whalen, the Court reversed Whalen's
conviction stating that Congress had not specifically authorized con-
secutive sentences for the greater and lesser-included offenses of
felony murder and rape.8 7
By converting Blockburger to a statutory rule, the Court permit-
ted cumulative punishment when Congress manifested a clear intent
regardless of whether the offenses were the same or distinct.
Whalen, therefore, nullifies Blockburger in the context of cumulative
punishment when there is clear legislative intent. In addition, by
interpreting Blockburger as a statutory rule, the Court reopened the
question of which constitutional standard courts should apply to the
Double Jeopardy Clause. In Illinois v. Vitale,8s the Supreme Court
addressed this issue by reassessing the nature of constitutional pro-
tection against double jeopardy.
5. Illinois v. Vitale: The Road to Grady
Prior to Whalen, the Supreme Court had made fairly consistent
changes to double jeopardy analysis in order to effectuate the pur-
poses of the Double Jeopardy Clause. By creating additional steps
in judicial analysis ofjeopardy claims, the Court assured defendants
greater protection against excessive punishment and multiple prose-
cutions than they had previously received under the traditional
Blockburger same offense test. With Blockburger transformed into a
statutory rule, however, the Court had to reassess the nature of con-
stitutional protection under the Double Jeopardy Clause and deter-
mine the extent to which congressional intent would affect this
protection. In Vitale, the Supreme Court re-evaluated the status of
double jeopardy protection in multiple prosecutions and gave the
first clear indication of its intent to modify double jeopardy analysis
from an offense-oriented rule to a conduct-based test.8 9
In Vitale, the defendant struck and killed two children in an au-
tomobile accident.90 A police officer issued a traffic citation that
86 445 U.S. 684, 691 (1980).
87 Id. at 695.
88 447 U.S. 410 (1980).
89 Id.
90 Id. at 411.
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charged Vitale with "failing to reduce speed to avoid an accident."9 1
At the first trial, Vitale was convicted and sentenced to pay a nomi-
nal fine.92 In a subsequent proceeding, the State charged Vitale
with involuntary manslaughter and Vitale responded with a motion
to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds.93 On appeal to the
Supreme Court, the sole issue was whether "failing to reduce
speed" created the same offense for double jeopardy purposes as
involuntary manslaughter. 94
The difficulty with this issue rests in the Illinois legislature's
failure to clarify whether "failing to reduce speed" was a necessary
element for establishing involuntary manslaughter. 95 This case
raised an important question under the Blockburger standard for
double jeopardy analysis, because the Court not only had to com-
pare statutory elements, but also had to review the prior proceed-
ings to determine if the second trial would require relitigating an
essential element of the first trial. In light of this standard, the
Supreme Court stated that if "failing to reduce speed" constituted a
necessary element of involuntary manslaughter, then it became a
lesser-included offense which barred a subsequent prosecution. 96
However, if the State could prove involuntary manslaughter without
relying on "failing to reduce speed" as the reckless act, state law
created two distinct offenses and the second trial could proceed.97
The Supreme Court remanded the case for clarification of the rela-
tionship between the two offenses.98
Justice White, who authored the majority opinion, made a sig-
nificant point in dicta suggesting that, even if the two offenses were
distinct under Blockburger-Brown, the defendant would still have a
91 Id
92 Id. at 412. Vitale was required to pay a $15 fine.
93 Id at 413.
94 Id at 415-16.
95 Idt at 416-19.
96 Id at 421.
97 Id
98 Justice Stevens,joined by Justices Brennan and Stewart, andJustice Marshall in a
separate dissenting opinion, disagreed with the majority's decision to remand, stating
that regardless of whether "failing to reduce speed" was a necessary element of proof,
the Double Jeopardy Clause still barred prosecution. Idt at 423. Justice Stevens also
disagreed with justice White's dicta stating,
[E]ven if the Illinois Supreme Court should hold on remand that failure
to reduce speed is not always a lesser-included offense as a matter of state
law, respondent will still have a "substantial" double jeopardy claim if the
State finds it necessary to rely on his failure to reduce speed in order to
sustain its manslaughter case. In my opinion such a claim would not
merely be "substantial"; it would be dispositive.
Id. at 426. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
It is also interesting to note that three of these four Justices joined in the majority
opinion in Grady v. Corbin, 110 S. Ct. 2084 (1990).
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"substantial double jeopardy claim" if the State sought to rely on
defendant's conduct to prove any element of the alleged offense-
conduct for which Vitale had already been prosecuted. 99 This state-
ment implies that, regardless of whether the Illinois legislature in-
tended to create separate offenses, the Double Jeopardy Clause
might still bar a subsequent prosecution. The statement indicated
the Court's willingness to strengthen double jeopardy protection by
insuring that these constitutional guarantees took precedence over
state interest in law enforcement. 00 In Grady v. Corbin,'0° the
Supreme Court adopted Justice White's Vitale dicta and established
a new "conduct" test for double jeopardy analysis which affords de-
fendants maximum double jeopardy protection in the context of
multiple prosecutions.
II
GRADY V. CORBIN
The recent Supreme Court decision in Grady represents a sig-
nificant transformation of double jeopardy analysis.10 2 In Grady, the
Court abandoned the offense-oriented approach of the traditional
Blockburger test and established a new conduct-based test designed
to insure that the constitutional guarantees of the Double Jeopardy
Clause take precedence over state interests in criminal enforcement.
A. Facts
In 1987, the defendant Thomas Corbin, while intoxicated,
drove his car across a highway median strip and collided with two
99 447 U.S. at 421.
100 Thomas, supra note 85, at 1394 n.183, comments on the significance of the Vitale
decision: "[A] fair inference is that a majority of the Court is willing to accept the prop-
osition, first clearly announced in Brown, that an additional protection is available to a
defendant who faces a second prosecution for the same conduct."
101 110 S. Ct. 2084 (1990).
102 For a general discussion of Grady and its effect on the Double Jeopardy Clause,
see Edward A. Mallett & Alexander Bunin, Criminal Law, 45 Sw. LJ. 253 (1991); George
C. Thomas, III, A Modest Proposal to Save the Double Jeopardy Clause, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 195
(1985); Robert N. Udashen, Criminal Procedure: Pretrial, 45 Sw. LJ. 279 (1991); James M.
Herrick, Note, Double Jeopardy Analysis Comes Home: The "Same Conduct" Standard in Grady
v. Corbin, 79 Ky. LJ. 847 (1991); Craig J. Webre, Note, Grady v. Corbin: Successive
Prosecutions Must Survive Heightened Double Jeopardy Protection, 36 Loy. L. REV. 1171, 1185
(1991); Sara Barton, Comment, Grady v. Corbin: An Unsuccessful Effort to Define "Same
Offense," 25 GA. L. REV. 143 (1990); The Supreme Court, 1989 Term: Leading Cases, 104
HARV. L. REV. 129, 148-58 (1990). See also Purcell v. United States, 594 A.2d 527, 529
(D.C. App. 1991), a case factually similar to Grady, in which the court held that a hearing
before the Bureau of Traffic Adjudication which imposed civil penalties did not preclude
a criminal prosecution for negligent homicide. "The DoubleJeopardy Clause only pro-
hibits successive criminal prosecutions or punishments for the same act. It does not bar a
criminal prosecution after a proceeding that results in a civil sanction; or vice versa." Id.
(citations omitted).
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oncoming vehicles. l03 Two passengers in one of these vehicles,
Daniel and Brenda Dirago, were severely injured in the accident
and, later that evening, Brenda Dirago died from the injuries sus-
tained.104 The police served Thomas Corbin with two misdemeanor
traffic citations, one for driving while intoxicated and the other for
failure to keep right of the median.' 0 5
Corbin pleaded guilty to both traffic tickets and the court ac-
cepted his plea unaware that a fatality stemmed from the acci-
dent.' 0 6 The court imposed the minimum sentence for both
offenses: a $350 fine, a $10 surcharge and a six month license revo-
cation.' 0 7 Two months later, a grand jury indicted Corbin for "reck-
less manslaughter, second-degree vehicular manslaughter, and
criminally negligent homicide."' 0 8 The State intended to prove the
homicide and assault charges by relying on three reckless acts:
(1) driving while intoxicated, (2) failing to keep right of the me-
dian, and (3) driving at an unreasonable speed in inclement
weather.'0 9 Corbin moved to dismiss the indictment on double
jeopardy grounds. 110
The trial court denied this motion, and subsequently Corbin
sought a writ of prohibition barring prosecution on all counts."'
The Appellate Division denied the writ but the New York Court
of Appeals reversed, stating inter alia that prosecution of the man-
slaughter charges violated "the DoubleJeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment pursuant to the Blockburger test because, as a matter of
state law, driving while intoxicated 'is unquestionably a lesser in-
cluded offense of second degree vehicular manslaughter.' "112 The
court of appeals also relied on the "pointed dictum" in Vitale and
held that the Double Jeopardy Clause would also bar subsequent
prosecution because the State had "'an intention to rely on the
prior traffic offenses as the acts necessary to prove the homicide and
assault charges.' "11 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to de-
cide the applicable standard for double jeopardy.' 14
103 110 S. Ct. at 2087.
104 Id at 2088.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 2088-89.
107 Id at 2089.
108 Id
109 Id
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
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B. The New "Conduct" Test-Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court, affirming the New York Court of Appeals
decision, enunciated a new standard for double jeopardy analysis:
the "conduct" test, which adopted Justice White's dicta in the Vitale
decision.11 5 This conduct test culminated the Court's efforts to as-
sure defendants maximum protection against successive prosecu-
tions and unwarranted cumulative punishment under the Double
Jeopardy Clause.
In Grady, the majority held that the Double Jeopardy Clause
"bars any subsequent prosecution in which the government, to es-
tablish an essential element of an offense charged in that prosecu-
tion, will prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the
defendant has already been prosecuted."' 1 6 This test requires as-
sessment of the State's position to determine exactly what conduct it
intends to prove.in the subsequent proceeding. Justice Brennan,, 17
who authored the majority opinion, first addressed the State's con-
tention that the traditional Blockburger test was the exclusive standard
for double jeopardy analysis.118 Brennan rejected this assertion in
two respects.
First, Brennan argued that precedents, such as Brown and Ashe,
required that inquiry extend beyond the Blockburger threshold.1 19
The doctrine of collateral estoppel and the standard of greater and
lesser-included offenses required courts to delve further into the
merits of the second proceeding to decide a defendant's double
jeopardy claim. Brennan stated that these decisions and the fact
that Blockburger is now simply a statutory rule, reflected the Court's
intent to make the same offense test only one of several standards
for double jeopardy analysis.' 20
Second, Brennan argued that the problems which arose from
applying a strict Blockburger test to multiple prosecutions influenced
the Court to avoid exclusive reliance on this test. 12' A literal appli-
cation of Blockburger may lead to harsher sentences and permits
prosecutors to rehearse presentation of proof and to burden the de-
115 Id. at 2093.
116 Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
117 Justice White, Justice Marshall, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Stevens all joined
the opinion.
118 110 S. Ct. at 2091 n.8 (The majority rejected Scalia's interpretation and support
for the idea that Blockburger established the exclusive rule for DoubleJeopardy analysis.).
119 Id. at 2092.
120 Id.
121 Id.
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fendant with several proceedings122 -a result that is contrary to the
purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. 123
The new conduct test applied to the issues in Grady simplified
the disposition of Corbin's double jeopardy claim. The prosecution
intended to rely on all of the elements of Grady's conduct which led
to the first conviction-namely, "failing to keep right of the median"
and "driving while intoxicated"-as part of the proof of the man-
slaughter charges in the second proceeding. 124
The majority's creation of the new "conduct" test provoked a
strong dissent by Justice Scalia.' 25 Scalia viewed the Court's deci-
sion as a derogation not only of the Double Jeopardy Clause's inter-
pretative history, but also of the "recognized exclusivity" of the
traditional Blockburger test.126 The thrust of his elaborate opinion
implied that the Court intentionally adopted an ambiguous and in-
defensible standard in order to camouflage justice Brennan's imple-
mentation of the "same transaction" approach in a criminal
prosecution, an approach which Scalia contended had been consist-
ently rejected by the Court.127 Scalia's primary criticisms focused
on what he termed the "practical effects" of the Court's innovation
on future double jeopardy analysis.' 28
C. The "Practical Effects" of the Grady Conduct Test-Justice
Scalia's Dissent
The majority's conduct test, in Scalia's opinion, represented a
deviation from "long standing precedent"' 29 and "200 years of es-
tablished doublejeopardy jurisprudence."'' 3 0 He viewed this expan-
sion as unwarranted and objected to it for several reasons.
Initially, Scalia argued that under a literal reading of the Double
Jeopardy Clause, the defendant only has the right not to be tried for
the same offense.131 With a brief definitional reference to the mean-
ing of the word "offense," Scalia concluded that this term does not
122 Id- at 2086.
123 Id. at 2091-92.
124 Id. at 2094.
125 Justice Scalia was joined in the opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Kennedy.
Justice O'Connor wrote a separate dissent arguing that the majority's decision
"stray[s] from a proper interpretation of the scope of the Double Jeopardy Clause...
The Court's ruling today effectively renders our holding in Dowling a nullity in many
circumstances." Id. at 2095 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
126 Id at 2097 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
127 Id. at 2104.
128 Id. at 2096.
129 Id. at 2101.
130 Id. at 2105.
131 Id. at 2096.
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incorporate a defendant's acts or conduct. 132 After an extensive re-
view of English common-law and American judicial precepts,1 33
Scalia also contended that the concept of judicial double jeopardy
analysis is not novel. He stated that the Blockburger "same offense"
test enunciated in 1932 "reflected a venerable understanding" of
the purposes of the DoubleJeopardy Clause, and that the Court had
designed the test to provide a simple judicial standard for double
jeopardy analysis.'8 4
Scalia regarded the Blockburger test as the exclusive standard for
double jeopardy analysis. He cited only two cases in which the
Court relaxed the exclusive focus of the Blockburger standard: Ashe,
which incorporated the doctrine of collateral estoppel into the
scope of the Double Jeopardy Clause, and Harris, which extended
Blockburger analysis to include the standard of greater and lesser-
included offenses.1 35 Ashe barred a second prosecution in situations
which would require the State to relitigate factual issues that had
already been resolved in the defendant's favor. Harris barred a sec-
ond prosecution if the statutory elements of one offense were wholly
incorporated in another. 136 Scalia considered these situations the
only recognized judicial extensions of double jeopardy analysis.
Scalia also criticized the majority for relying on the Vitale dicta
as the foundation of the "conduct" test. He argued that Justice
White's opinion never explicitly stated that a second prosecution
would be barred should the State use the same conduct to prove a
second offense. 137 Justice White's opinion only suggested that the
defendant would have a "substantial" jeopardy claim. This state-
ment, however, was never clarified by the Court's holding.'3 8
Scalia concluded that in light of these historical and judicial
precedents, a proper analysis of the charges under the traditional
Blockburger test would conclusively resolve whether the State uncon-
stitutionally subjected Corbin to a second trial on the same of-
fense. 139 In the first trial, Corbin was convicted for driving while
intoxicated and failing to remain on the right side of the median. 140
In the second proceeding, the State charged him with reckless man-
132 Id. at 2097.
133 IdL at 2097-2101.
134 Id. at 2100-2101.
135 Id. at 2097.
136 Id.
137 Id at 2101. In addition, Scalia stated that with the issue now squarely before the
Court, it should decline to adopt a conduct-based test to bar such successive
prosecutions.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 2088.
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slaughter, second-degree vehicular manslaughter, and criminally
negligent homicide.' 41 These three offenses required proof of ele-
ments which the two charges in the first trial did not.142 Therefore,
Scalia argued, under the "correct" Blockburger standard, the Double
Jeopardy Clause would not bar a -second prosecution.143
Scalia noted that one of the difficulties with the Grady decision is
that it is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's earlier decision in
Dowling v. United States.144 In Dowling, the State used a witness's tes-
timony from a prior robbery trial, which had resulted in acquittal, to
prove the defendant's participation in a second robbery. 45 The
Court held that collateral estoppel does not "bar later use of evi-
dence relating to prior conduct." 46 Scalia argued that this decision
should have "foreclosed" the result reached by the majority in Grady
because Dowling permitted a subsequent prosecution based on evi-
dence of the defendant's conduct used in the first proceeding. 147
Scalia also rejected what he termed the majority's "inadequate
limitations" on the breadth of the Grady conduct test. The first limi-
tation provides that the conduct test only applies when the prosecu-
tion seeks to establish an essential element of an offense charged in
the second prosecution. Scalia summarily dismissed this limitation
as meaningless because all evidence pertaining to guilt seeks to es-
tablish an essential element of the offense. 148 The Dowling case aptly
illustrated this point because in both trials the central issue was the
defendant's identity as a robber, and to successfully litigate this fact,
the State only introduced evidence pertaining to his identity, an es-
sential element of the robbery charge. 149
141 Id at 2089.
142 Id at 2105.
143 Id
144 Id at 2102. See Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342 (1990). In Dowling, the
defendant was convicted for a bank robbery based on evidence from a prior proceeding.
In the first trial, the Government charged Dowling with attempted buglary and as-
sault in connection with an alleged robbery that occurred at the home of Mrs. Vena
Henry. Id at 344. Mrs. Henry testified that she could identify Dowling because his mask
came off during the incident. The trial court, however, acquitted Dowling on all charges
in connection with the incident.
In a subsequent trial, the Government introduced Mrs. Henry's testimony into evi-
dence to strengthen its case against Dowling for the bank robbery. Id. at 344-45. The
Court permitted the evidence and instructed the jury about Dowling's acquittal and the
limited purpose for which the testimony was being admitted. Id at 346. Dowling raised
the defense of double jeopardy based on the prior acquittal.
145 Id. at 344-45.
146 Id. at 350.
147 Id.
148 110 S. Ct. at 2103.
149 See discussion of Dowling supra note 145.
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The second limitation requires that evidence introduced in the
second prosecution prove conduct that constitutes an offence for
which the defendant has already been prosecuted. Scalia acknowl-
edged that this limitation has some merit, but argued that it still
creates potentially anomalous results. 150
First, Scalia argued that if the prosecution intended to use all of
the facts establishing the crime in the first proceeding, then the new
conduct test compels the State to adopt a same transaction ap-
proach to criminal prosecution-a position which Justice Brennan
had consistently advocated throughout the Court's various decisions
on the scope of double jeopardy analysis.15' The same transaction
approach requires the State to bring all possible criminal charges
arising out of a single occurrence or act in one proceeding. For ex-
ample, suppose a defendant robbed a convenience store and, while
fleeing the scene, dropped a valuable watch stolen two days earlier
from a jewelry store in the same neighborhood. The conduct test
compels the State to combine both charges of robbery in one trial,
because a conviction on either offense in an earlier trial would pro-
hibit the State from raising the other offense in a subsequent
proceeding.
Scalia pointed out that if prosecutors use only a minimal amount
of the alleged conduct, insufficient to establish an offense, then the
Grady test would permit successive prosecutions. 52 Returning to
the hypothetical, suppose the defendant had also assaulted a cus-
tomer during the robbery. A second trial on the assault charge
could proceed, even if the State introduced evidence of the prior
robbery, because proof of an assault charge is not enough to estab-
lish theft. Scalia argued that the burden on the individual to defend
against all the charges arising out of this incident will still exist re-
gardless of whether the State brings the charges in a single or multi-
ple proceedings.
Finally, Scalia empathized with the lower court judges, defense
attorneys, and prosecutors, who will have to "decipher" the nebu-
lous terms of the Grady "conduct" test to find the appropriate limita-
tions and criterion for application of the standard. 55 Scalia stated
150 110 S.Ct. at 2103 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
151 See, e.g., Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 511 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("I
adhere to my view that ... the Double Jeopardy Clause... requires the prosecution,
except in most limited circumstances not present here, 'to join at one trial all charges
against a defendant that grow out of a single criminal act, occurence, episode or transac-
tion.' " (quoting Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 453-54 (1970) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring))). See also Grubb v. Oklahoma, 409 U.S. 1017, 1017 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (same).
152 110 S. Ct. at 2104 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
153 Id.
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that this decision was really designed to "fully embrace [] Justice
BRENNAN's 'same transaction' theory," and he warned prosecutors
"confronted with the inscrutability of today's opinion . . . [to] be
well advised to proceed on the assumption that the 'same transac-
tion' theory has already been adopted."1 54
III
DOUBLE JEOPARDY IN A RICO CONTEXT: Is GRADY A HELP
OR A HINDRANCE?
The new conduct test reflects a more restrictive measure
designed to limit prosecutorial freedom and to ensure defendants
double jeopardy protection against unwarranted punishments and
successive prosecutions. Despite the apparent benefits of this deci-
sion to defendants, extending the Grady conduct test into the RICO
context produces potentially anomalous results.
A. Early Double Jeopardy Analysis in RICO Prosecutions
RICO implicates double jeopardy issues precisely because of
the compound nature of the statute. In order to show a "pattern of
racketeering activity" under RICO, the Government must establish
the existence of at least two predicate violations. Most RICO prose-
cutions have involved multiple proceedings because the RICO sub-
stantive offenses are often separated from the underlying
predicates. As a result, double jeopardy claims usually arise when
the Government, after pursuing a judgment on the substantive
RICO offense, attempts to secure a conviction on the predicates, or
vice versa.155
Under the traditional Blockburger same offense test, RICO sub-
stantive offenses are easily separated from their predicates because a
RICO violation requires the additional elements of a "pattern of
racketeering activity" and an "enterprise."' 156 Strict Blockburger anal-
ysis, therefore, treats the RICO substantive offense as distinct from
its predicates, and as a result the constitutional prohibition against
imposition of cumulative punishment is not violated in the RICO
context.
154 Id at 2104, 2105.
155 For cases involving successive prosecutions on RICO and underlying predicates,
see United States v. Gonzalez, 921 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 178
(1991); United States v. Esposito, 912 F.2d 60 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. dismissed, 11l S. Ct.
806 (1991); United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Virgilio
v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 2009 (1991); United States v. Grayson, 795 F.2d 278 (3d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1018 (1987).
156 See supra notes 25-38 and accompanying text.
1992] 713
CORNELL L4 W REVIEW
As the Supreme Court modified and refined double jeopardy
analysis, however, RICO defendants tried to avail themselves of the
increased protection. After Ashe, defendants argued that collateral
estoppel precluded a subsequent trial on a RICO offense or its
predicate because the court had already adjudicated the defendant's
unlawful activity in the first proceeding.' 57 Courts, however, have
consistently rejected this argument, finding that proof of a RICO
violation involves different issues of fact than those required to find
a per se violation of state and federal criminal laws.' 58
Defendants raised similar assertions after Brown and Harris, ar-
guing that RICO predicates are really lesser-included offenses in the
substantive offense because they require no additional elements of
proof beyond that necessary to establish the RICO violation.' 59
Courts also rejected this argument, stating that RICO's legislative
history and statutory language clearly indicated Congress's intent
that the offenses be treated as distinct. To do otherwise would ne-
gate the remedial purpose of RICO.' 60
By rejecting these double jeopardy challenges, courts have up-
held the purposes of RICO and removed any hindrance to effective
law enforcement against organized crime. The Grady decision, how-
ever, requires courts to re-evaluate the merits of a double jeopardy
challenge to RICO prosecutions.
B. Applying the Grady "Conduct" Test to RICO Criminal
Prosecutions
While the Grady Court took great care to enunciate a new stan-
dard for double jeopardy analysis, it failed to clarify whether the
conduct test completely replaces the current Blockburger standard or is
157 See, e.g., Esposito, 912 F.2d 60, 61; United States v. Ruggiero, 754 F.2d 927, 935
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
158 The argument against collateral estoppel is that a RICO substantive offense fo-
cuses on thepattern of illegal activity in an enterprise more than the per se illegal activity.
For example, if a defendant were involved in drug trafficking and gambling, the prosecu-
tion would only have to show that these activities occurred and that they violate state
laws. They would not have to show all the elements required to prove the offense, such
as mens rea. See, e.g., United States v. Russo, 801 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v.
Ryland, 806 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1057 (1987).
159 See, e.g., United States v. Hawkins, 658 F.2d 279, 288 (5th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Persico, 620 F. Supp. 836, 845 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aft'd, 774 F.2d 30 (N.Y. 1985).
160 See, e.g., United States v. Boffa, 688 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1988); United States v.
Hartley, 678 F.2d 961 (11th Cir.), reh'g denied, 688 F.2d 852 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1170 (1983); United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S.
961 (1981); United States v. Forsythe, 594 F.2d 947 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v.
Rone, 598 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, Little v. United States, 445 U.S. 946
(1980). For a discussion of RICO and lesser-included offenses, see generally, Robert M.
Grass, BifurcatedJury Deliberations in Criminal RICO Trials, 57 FORDHAM L. REv. 745 (1989);
Ciupak, supra note 48, at 386-93; Thomas, supra note 85, at 1368-86.
714 [Vol. 77:687
NOTE-RICO AND DOUBLE JEOPARDY
simply an additional step in the double jeopardy analysis. If the
Supreme Court only created the Grady conduct test as an additional
step, the Blockburger standard would be modified again to add a
fourth tier to double jeopardy analysis. This new standard, Block-
burger-Grady, would require courts to: first, compare statutory ele-
ments of the relative offenses; second, determine if the offenses
were greater or lesser-included; third, perform a retrospective re-
view of the prior proceedings, and fourth, look at the conduct un-
derlying the offenses in the first trial. This result also implies that
Blockburger would remain a rule of statutory construction. As ap-
plied to RICO prosecutions, this version of the Grady conduct test
would give defendants little protection because Congress mani-
fested a clear intent to permit RICO's enhanced penalties and to
provide prosecutors with the greatest freedom to pursue RICO
violations.
Alternatively, if the Court intended to completely replace Block-
burger, then the conduct test returns double jeopardy analysis to a
constitutionally based standard. Grady could be applied as a consti-
tutional standard in two ways: literally and contextually. A literal
application of the conduct test would restrict prosecutorial freedom,
while a contextual application would create disparate constitutional
treatment of defendants. In a RICO context, both applications yield
inconsistent results.
The Grady Court stated that the conduct test precludes a second
prosecution when "the government ... will prove conduct that con-
stitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been prose-
cuted.." 161 Under a literal interpretation of this language, Grady
precludes all subsequent prosecutions when the same criminal con-
duct is involved. In essence, Grady directs prosecutors to combine
all charges arising out of a single criminal episode in one proceed-
ing, or forfeit the opportunity to litigate the omitted offenses in a
second trial. This "choose-it or lose-it" approach would severely
restrict prosecutorial freedom.
Under RICO, before a substantive offense can be charged, the
government must establish that the defendant engaged in two pred-
icate acts which are chargeable under state or federal law.' 62 Thus,
whether Grady affords defendants any protection in successive pros-
ecutions of a RICO offense and predicate acts ultimately depends
161 Id. at 2093 (emphasis added).
162 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) defines racketeering activity as:
[A]ny act or threat involving murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson, rob-
bery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in narcotic
or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and pun-
ishable by imprisonment for more than one year. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(1)
(West 1991).
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on the sequence of the two proceedings. If the government first pros-
ecuted a defendant on the predicate acts and subsequently relied on
these acts to establish a substantive RICO violation, a literal applica-
tion of Grady would compel a finding of unconstitutionality. If the
order of prosecution were reversed, however, and the RICO offense
was prosecuted prior to the predicate offense, then Grady would not
preclude the subsequent prosecution.1 63 Thus, a literal interpreta-
tion of the Grady conduct test results in disparate treatment of RICO
defendants. Defendants prosecuted in one sequence (predicate of-
fenses first, then RICO) would receive constitutional protection,
while those prosecuted in the reverse sequence would not.
Alternatively, the Grady conduct test could be applied according
to the context in which the case was decided. Some courts have con-
strued Grady to apply only when there is a single defendant or single
discrete act, and when the criminal offenses arose out of the same
transaction or occurrence. 164 This approach, however, has little ap-
plication in the RICO context, because RICO targets multiple of-
fenders and multiple offenses.
A typical RICO prosecution usually joins several defendants,
each of whom has performed a variety of illegal acts.165 To establish
the requisite pattern of racketeering, the government must allege
violations of two predicate offenses. Furthermore, the definition of
"pattern" contained in section 1961(5)166 implies that these acts
need not have occurred in the same transaction. As a result, this
contextual application of the Grady conduct test in RICO would also
produce skewed results. RICO defendants prosecuted in the first
trial on predicate offenses that arose out of a single criminal episode
would be constitutionally protected from a subsequent prosecution
on a substantive RICO violation, while defendants with predicate
offenses arising from different criminal transactions would not.
163 For example, suppose defendant Y enagaged in an activity which gave rise to two
predicate acts-drug dealing and bribery-and then, at a later date, also participated in
a robbery. Assuming the requisite enterprise, if the State prosecuted Y for all three
predicatesfirst and subsequently relied on these same acts for a RICO indictment, Grady
would bar the second prosecution. However, if the State brought the RICO violation
first, relying only on the two predicate acts of drug dealing and bribery, a later prosecu-
tion for the robbery arguably would be permissible because the robbery constituted
neither the same conduct, transaction, nor essential element of the first prosecution. But
see Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 (1977) ("The DoubleJeopardy Clause is not such a
fragile guarantee that prosecutors can avoid its limitations by the simple expedient of
dividing a single crime into a series of temporal or spatial units.").
164 See infra notes 173-77 and accompanying text.
165 See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
166 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988) ("[The second act must have] occurred within ten
years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of
racketeering activity").
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Aside from the inconsistent results that the conduct test would
yield in a RICO prosecution, Grady creates a more fundamental
problem: tension between the goals of RICO and the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause. RICO serves a dual purpose in that it not only targets
organized criminal networks but also deters groups from engaging
in the proscribed illegal activity in the future. RICO expands the
resources of prosecutors by permitting joinder of multiple offend-
ers and offenses in a single proceeding. In order to effectuate its
goals of eradicating organized crime in legitimate business, RICO's
structure necessarily implicates double jeopardy issues. 167
167 Comparatively, RICO could be considered analogous to habitual offender rules,
which deter continuous criminal activity by imposing a more stringent penalty on a re-
peat offender. Habitual offender rules are similar to RICO in that they are legislatively
created and designed specifically to target individuals engaged in continuous illegal ac-
tivity. In addition, these rules enhance the criminal penalities imposed against repeat
offenders. See 39 AM. JUR. 2n Habitual Criminals and Subsequent Offenses §§ 1-32 (1968 &
Supp. 1991).
The primary purpose of statutes authorizing additional punishment of a
person convicted of a second or a subsequent offense is to warn first of-
fenders and thus deter their criminal activities. [S]uch statutes are di-
rected at persons who persist in criminality after once being convicted of
an offense. A further purpose of such legislation is to promote justice
and protect society by ridding communities of the depravity of un-
reformed criminals.
Id. § 3. See also People v.Johnson, 157 Cal. Rptr. 150, 153 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979)("mhe
increased penalty [imposed on a defendant] for a prior felony conviction ... is to dis-
courage recidivist criminal conduct."); Eutsey v. State, 383 So. 2d 219, 223 (Fla. 1980)(a
state's habitual offender act is designed for the purpose of allowing enhanced penalties
for defendant's recidivist behavior). For a comparative discussion of RICO and habitual
offender rules, see William E. Dorigan & Alfred H. Edwall, Jr., A Proposed RICO Pattern
Requirement for the Habitual Commericial Offender, 15 WM. MrrCHELL L. REV. 35 (1989);
Goldsmith, supra note 34.
Habitual offender rules also attempt to deter future activity by making an example
of the recidivist. These rules have survived double jeopardy challenges primarily be-
cause courts have construed a State's interest in deterring recidivist conduct to outweigh
the repeat offender's right to challenge the subsequent prosecution on double jeopardy
grounds. See, e.g., Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732 (1948) (The court construed a
state habitual offender act to be valid despite double jeopardy challenges of the peti-
tioner. "The sentence as a fourth offender or habitual criminal is not to be viewed as
either new jeopardy or [an] additional penalty for the earlier crimes. It is a stiffened
penalty for the latest crime, which is considered ... an aggravated offense because a
repetitive one3'); Carlesi v. New York, 233 U.S. 51, 58 (1914) (application of statute not
barred by double jeopardy because "[it] is aimed at habitual criminals [and] the punish-
ment is for the new crime only"); Curtis v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 802, 803 (9th Cir. 1989)
("The fact that the same issue was litigated in the prior habitual offender proceeding
does not automatically raise the bar of double jeopardy."); Baker v. Duckworth, 752
F.2d 302, 304 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1019 (1985) ("[T]he use of prior convic-
tions to enhance a convict's sentence ... does not violate the guaranty against double
jeopardy beause the convict is not twice tried or punished for the same offense."). Simi-
larly, the purpose of RICO is to provide enhanced penalties and additional legal reme-
dies for use against those individuals who engage in criminal activity to further an
enterprise.
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The Double Jeopardy Clause protects an individual from un-
warranted punishment and multiple prosecutions for the same of-
fense. Grady, interpreted as a constitutional standard, maximizes
this protection by ensuring that a defendant's conduct is only liti-
gated once. The difficulty, however, is that Grady would not apply
the constitutional standard consistently in the RICO context.
Double Jeopardy protection should be paramount to legislative in-
tent, and its protection should apply equally to all defendants.
Grady applied in a RICO context, however, only protects parties in a
particular sequence of RICO prosecutions. In effect, courts would
have to hold RICO prosecutions for similar activities unconstitu-
tional as to some defendants and constitutional as to others. This
result is inconsistent with the goals of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
C. Resolving the Conflict Between Criminal RICO and the
Grady "Conduct" Test
Whether RICO and the Double Jeopardy Clause can be recon-
ciled ultimately depends on the Supreme Court's clarification of the
Grady conduct test. Though few courts have interpreted Grady, two
conflicting views about the breadth of the conduct test have already
developed in the lower courts.
The first view, propounded by the Second Circuit, adopts a lit-
eral and expansive reading of Grady. In United States v. Calderone,168
which involved successive prosecutions on conspiracy charges, 6 9
the court held that Grady barred the second prosecution for a
''smaller" conspiracy because the State's new indictment alleged the
same activities for which the defendant had been acquitted in first
trial. 170 The court also rejected the State's two-fold argument that
Grady should either be limited to its facts or held inapplicable to
conspiracy prosecutions. The Court stated that "limit[ing] Grady to
its facts mischaracterizes the intended scope of the Court's deci-
sion" and that "[a]lthough Grady involved the successive prosecu-
tion of separate crimes arising from a single event, nothing in the
opinion suggests that the Court intended to limit the 'same conduct'
168 917 F.2d 717 (2nd Cir. 1990), petition for cert. filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3704 (1991).
169 In the first trial, the defendants Calderone, Catalano, and 26 others were in-
dicted for involvement in an international drug conspiracy (the Adamita Indictment).
Id. at 718. Calderone and Catalano were later acquitted of the conspiracy charges be-
cause of insufficient evidence. The government filed a new indictment (the Calderone
Indictment) against Calderone and Catalano which essentially alleged the same activities
and conspiracy charges raised in the Adamita Indictment but only alleged heroin distri-
bution in the New York Metropolitan area. Id. at 718, 719. Calderone and Catalano, on
appeal from denial of their motion to dismiss, raised the issue of double jeopardy in
light of Grady.
170 Id. at 722.
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test to those particular circumstances."'' t Thus, the Second Circuit
position interprets the word "conduct" literally, reading Grady to
apply to "all double jeopardy claims in the context of successive
prosecutions."1 72
The Third Circuit, however,- advocates a narrower interpreta-
tion of Grady, particularly in the context of successive RICO prose-
cutions. 173 In United States v. Pungitore,'7 4 a case which involved
successive prosecutions for RICO violations and the underlying
predicate offenses, 175 the court rejected a broad reading of Grady
and held it to be inapplicable in a RICO context. The court stated
that though "the language employed by the Supreme Court in its
formulation of the 'same conduct' test could be interpreted as ex-
tending double jeopardy protection to all situations where the gov-
ernment intends again to prove conduct constituting an offense
subject to an earlier conviction," Grady could not be easily applied in
a RICO context. 175 Thus, the Third Circuit approach adopts a con-
171 Id. at 721.
172 I The Second Circuit adopted a similar position in United States v. Russo, 906
F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam), where, in light of Grady, the court reversed the
defendant's conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503 and 371-obstructingjustice and
conspiring to obstruct justice-because the offenses were predicate acts alleged in an
earlier RICO prosecution from which he was acquitted. In this particular case, however,
the government moved for remand for entry of a n0le prosequi. Id at 78.
173 The Third Circuit advocates this narrower interpretation of the Grady holding
not only for RICO, but also for similar complex criminal offenses. For example, Contin-
uous Criminal Enterprise (CCE) prosecutions under 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988) are similar
to RICO indictments in terms of penalties and elements of proof required to establish a
substantive violation. See id §§ 848(a)-(c) defining continuous criminal enterprises and
penalties. For a good comparative discussion of CCE and RICO, see Barbara Sicalides,
Comment, RICO, CCE, and International Extradition, 62 TEMP. L. Rv. 1281 (1989).
174 910 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2011 (1991).
175 Pungitore involved a number of defendants convicted for CCE as well as RICO
violations. Specifically, defendant Nicodemo Scarfo was convicted for conspiracy and
extortion in violation of RICO, but was acquitted in a prior trial for CCE violations. See
id. at 1107. On appeal, Scarfo relied on Grady and argued that acquittal in the first trial
of the conspiracy and extortion charges, which formed the predicate acts for the RICO
violation, precluded a second prosecution on a substantive RICO offense. Id
Judge Greenberg, writing for the majority, rejected Scarfo's expansive reading of
the Grady holding.
We conclude that Grady, which finds its roots in "single transaction" cases
such as Brown, is no more applicable in the instant circumstances than
Brown was in Garrett.... Thus, we reject Scarfo's double jeopardy argu-
ment on the basis of Grayson, in which we decided that successive prose-
cutions of RICO and its underlying predicates are constitutionally
permissible, and Garrett, which distinguished single course of conduct
crimes, like those in Brown and Grady, from compound-complex crimes,
like those at issue here. However significant Grady v. Corbin may prove to
be in cases of simple felonies, we are confident that it has nothing whatsoever to
do with the compound-complex crimes at issue here.
Id. at 1111 (emphasis added).
176 Id. at 1110. The Third Circuit reached a similiar result in United States v. Espo-
sito, 912 F.2d 60 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. dismissed, 111 S. Ct. 806 (1991), which raised the
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textual interpretation of Grady, limiting its applicability to single-
offense situations. 177
Without consensus in the circuit courts as to the proper inter-
pretation of the conduct test, Grady's precedential value is suspect.
Several commentators 178 agree with Scalia's assessment that Grady is
"unlikely to survive." 179 The Supreme Court will eventually have to
clarify whether Grady should be taken at face value and held applica-
ble to all successive prosecutions that involve any conduct identical
to the first proceeding, or whether it should be confined to its facts
and read only to apply to single offense or separate transaction
crimes (which excludes the more complex criminal offenses such as
RICO and CCE).
The Court will probably decide Grady's fate later this term in
United States v. Felix, t80 a Tenth Circuit decision currently pending
before the Supreme Court. Felix involved successive prosecutions
for conspiracy and narcotics violations arising out of a single trans-
issue of whether double jeopardy barred a subsequent prosecution on predicate acts
after an acquittal on a substantive RICO charge.
"[W]e conclude that the even more complex conduct needed to support a
RICO charge, such as the requirement of both an enterprise and a pat-
tern of activity, constitutes an offense different than and separate from
that encompassed by the narcotics charges alleged here. . . . [H]ence,
Grady does not mandate a finding that this prosecution is barred by
double jeopardy.
Esposito, 912 F.2d at 65.
177 See also United States v. LeQuire, 943 F.2d 1554, 1559 (11 th Cir. 1991) (constru-
ing Grady to be "more applicable in single offense situations, such as drunk driving").
178 See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 102, at 195-96 ("[I] also believe the lack of articu-
lated limitations on the principle [in Grady] renders the 5-4 decision.. .unstable....
Moreover, I agree with Scalia's prediction of [Grady's] future if it remains in its current
form .. "); Barton, supra note 102, at 166 ("Regardless of which approach it ultimately
chooses to adopt, however, the Court should affirmatively dismantle Grady's 'same con-
duct' test before it self-destructs in the lower courts."). But cf, Herrick, supra note 102,
at 866:
The basic rule [of Grady] is likely to prevail nonetheless, since only a
'same conduct' standard can adequately protect defendants against po-
tential abuse of the power to define offenses. With 'conduct' as the
guide, the double jeopardy clause can more thoroughly embody the prac-
tical protections it was meant to afford.
Id.
179 Grady v. Corbin, I10 S. Ct. 2084, 2104-05 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting):
A limitation that is so unsupported in reason and so absurd in application
is unlikely to survive.... One can readily imagine the words of our first
opinion effecting this extension: "When we said in Grady that the second
prosecution is impermissible if it 'will prove conduct' that constitutes the
prior offense, we did not mean that it will establish commission of that
offense with the degree of completeness that would permit a jury to con-
vict. It suffices if the evidence in the second prosecution 'proves' the pre-
viously prosecuted offense in the sense of tending to establish one or
more of the elements of that offense."
180 926 F.2d 1522 (10th Cir.). cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 47 (1991).
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action that traversed two states.181 The transaction began in Tulsa,
Oklahoma, where the defendant Felix purchased the equipment and
chemicals necessary to process narcotics.18 2 In a separate transac-
tion, Felix ordered additional materials which were transported to a
trailer in Joplin, Missouri.' 8 3 In Missouri, Felix was convicted for
"attempt[ing]-to-manufacture" methamphetamine based on evi-
dence seized from the trailer.'8 4 Subsequently, Felix was indicted
and convicted in Oklahoma for "conspiracy, manufacture, and pos-
session with the intent to distribute methamphetamine."' 8 5 The
court reversed Felix's conviction, holding that "under the clear
principle pronounced in Grady ... the successive prosecution of Fe-
lix in Oklahoma for the same conduct for which he was previously
convicted in Missouri violated the DoubleJeopardy Clause."18 6 The
Tenth Circuit thus followed the Second Circuit approach and stated
that though few courts have interpreted Grady, "its intended breadth
is obvious from its language."' 8 7
Felix presents the Supreme Court with a prime opportunity to
reformulate the Grady conduct test. It also gives the Court a second
chance'88 to clarify the meaning of "conduct" as applied to single
and multiple transactions as well as simple and complex criminal
offenses such as RICO. In light of the purposes of RICO, the varied
interpretations of Grady, and the potentially inconsistent results
yielded by an unmodified Grady conduct test, the optimal solution is
to limit Grady to its facts and hold it inapplicable in a RICO context.
CONCLUSION
The Double Jeopardy Clause seeks to ensure that defendants
are protected from excessive punishments and unwarranted multi-
ple prosecutions. The Supreme Court's double jeopardy analysis
has developed to further these goals and the Grady conduct test cre-
ates a single standard that maximizes double jeopardy protection.
Congress enacted RICO to provide prosecutors with additional
legal remedies to combat the increased infiltration of organized
181 Id. at 1524-25.
182 Id. at 1524.
183 Id. at 1523.
184 Id.
185 Id- at 1524 n.1. At pretrial, Felix brought a motion to dismiss based on double
jeopardy grounds arising from the Missouri conviction. The trial judge denied the mo-
tion, finding the conspiracy and the "attempt-to-manufacture" methamphetamine of-
fenses separate. Id. at 1525.
186 Id. at 1530.
187 Id. at 1527.
188 WithJustice Brennan's retirement, whether the current Court will "rewrite" the
Grady conduct test is almost a foregone conclusion.
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crime into legitimate business. To achieve this goal, RICO incorpo-
rates existing state and federal offenses and enhances criminal pen-
alties that are designed to target group activity and deter continued
criminal conduct. The nature of a RICO prosecution necessarily
implicates double jeopardy issues. In light of the congressional in-
tent of the Act, achieving the goals of RICO requires treating cur-
rent double jeopardy analysis as inapplicable in the RICO context.
Grady and RICO are mutually exclusive and until the Supreme
Court rectifies the anomalies created by the conduct test, Grady
should not be viewed as the Achilles's heel of criminal RICO. The
proper resolution is to confine Grady to its facts and construe the
decision as inapplicable in a RICO context.
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